Property Rights Over Marital Transfers ∗ [ Preliminary Draft ]
@inproceedings{Anderson2011PropertyRO, title={Property Rights Over Marital Transfers ∗ [ Preliminary Draft ]}, author={S. Anderson and Chris Bidner}, year={2011} }
We develop a simple competitive model of the marriage market in which bridal families decide how much to transfer to their daughter and how much to transfer to a potential groom. By allocating property rights over total marital transfers in this way, the bridal family influences the outcome of intra-household bargaining. This approach formalizes and clarifies the dual roles of dowry as both as bequest for daughters and a marketclearing payment to grooms. The analysis helps explain the… CONTINUE READING
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