Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology


After some suggestions about how to clarify the confused metaphysical distinctions between dispositional and non-dispositional or categorical properties, I review some of the main interpretations of QM in order to show that – with the relevant exception of Bohm’s minimalist interpretation – quantum ontology is irreducibly dispositional. Such an irreducible character of dispositions must be explained differently in different interpretations, but the reducibility of the contextual properties in the case of Bohmian mechanics is guaranteed by the fact that the positions of particles play the role of the categorical basis, a role that in other interpretations cannot be filled by anything else. In Bohr’s and Everett-type interpretations, dispositionalism is instrumentalism in disguise.

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Dorato2006PropertiesAD, title={Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum Ontology}, author={Mauro Dorato}, year={2006} }