Problems of Majority Voting

@article{Tullock1959ProblemsOM,
  title={Problems of Majority Voting},
  author={Gordon Tullock},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1959},
  volume={67},
  pages={571 - 579}
}
  • G. Tullock
  • Published 1 December 1959
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
GORDON TULLOCK University of South Carolina E CONOMISTS have devoted a great deal of thought to problems of governmental policy and, in particular, to the question of proper allocation of resources between the public and private sectors.' On the other hand, little attention has been given to the actual process of decision-making or to the type of policy likely to come out of the 2 process. It is the purpose of this article to discuss one particular method of making governmental decisions… 
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