Probability and Conditionals

  title={Probability and Conditionals},
  author={Robert Stalnaker},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={64 - 80}
  • Robert Stalnaker
  • Published 1 March 1970
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Philosophy of Science
The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for… 
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