Probabilistic reasoning

  title={Probabilistic reasoning},
  author={Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman},
Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as "1 think that . . .," "chances are . . .," "it is unlikely that . . .," and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the… 

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