Probabilistic interconnection between interdependent networks promotes cooperation in the public goods game

  title={Probabilistic interconnection between interdependent networks promotes cooperation in the public goods game},
  author={B. Wang and X. Chen and L. Wang},
  journal={Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment},
  • B. Wang, X. Chen, L. Wang
  • Published 2 August 2012
  • Computer Science
  • Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Most previous works study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population by commonly employing an isolated single network. However, realistic systems are composed of many interdependent networks coupled with each other, rather than an isolated single one. In this paper, we consider a system including two interacting networks with the same size, entangled with each other by the introduction of probabilistic interconnections. We introduce the public goods game into such a system, and… 

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