Probabilistic interactions among players of a cooperative game

@inproceedings{Grabisch2004ProbabilisticIA,
  title={Probabilistic interactions among players of a cooperative game},
  author={Michel Grabisch and Marc Roubens},
  year={2004}
}
Let v be a cooperative game on the finite set of players N that is a set function v called capacity from the power set P(N) to IR such that v(∅) = 0. v(S), for any coalition S ⊂ N can be considered as the worth or power of the coalition of players being in the party S. The set of all games defined on N is denoted G(N). In order to avoid heavy notations, we will whenever possible omit braces for singletons, e.g. writing v(i), S ∪ i instead of v({i}), S ∪ {i}. Also, for pairs, triples, we will… CONTINUE READING

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