# Probabilistic Inference and the Concept of Total Evidence

```@article{Suppes1969ProbabilisticIA,
title={Probabilistic Inference and the Concept of Total Evidence},
author={Patrick Suppes},
journal={Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics},
year={1969},
volume={43},
pages={170-187}
}```
• P. Suppes
• Published 1969
• Philosophy
• Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics
My purpose is to examine a cluster of issues centering around the socalled statistical syllogism and the concept of total evidence. The kind of paradox that is alleged to arise from uninhibited use of the statistical syllogism is of the following sort.
In ‘The Aim of Inductive Logic’, Rudolph Carnap has offered a clear statement of his conception of the way in which Inductive Logic or Confirmation Theory contributes to a theory of rational
In this paper I examine the extent to which problems in the foundations of probability are relevant to the testing of theories, and what view towards probability, if any, can be inferred from the
In Hailperin 1996 , in addition to its formal development of Probability Logic, there are many sections devoted to historical origins, illustrative examples, and discussion of related work by other
The meaning and justification of the requirement of total evidence are examined. It is argued that there are several significantly different interpretations of the requirement, but each
What is certain extends well beyond the a priori, the testimony of our senses and the records of our memory. No one engaged in deciding between alternative courses of action or in determining the
In his article ‘The Conception of Probability as a Logical Relation’ [1] A.J. Ayer has criticized the logical interpretation of inductive probability on which J. M. Keynes [22], Rudolf Carnap [6],
This essay describes a variety of contributions which relate to the connection of probability with logic. Some are grand attempts at providing a logical foundation for probability and inductive
• N. Nilsson
• Philosophy, Computer Science
Artif. Intell.
• 1986
Logical Foundations of ProbabilityBy Rudolf Carnap. Pp. xvii + 607. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951.) 42s. net.
~0. Introduction. The idea of treating probability as a real valued function defined on sentences is an old one (see ['6] and [7], where other references can be found). Carnap's at tempt to set up a

### Induction and hypotheses

• Induction and hypotheses
• 1957

• 1965