Private Protection in Russia and Poland

@article{Frye2002PrivatePI,
  title={Private Protection in Russia and Poland},
  author={Timothy Frye},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  year={2002},
  volume={46},
  pages={572}
}
  • Timothy Frye
  • Published 2002
  • Business
  • American Journal of Political Science
protection against rival protection organizations. Second, private pro? tection thrives where shops are inspected frequently by many agen? cies, indicating that disorganized regulation increases informal activity and promotes private protection. In addition, businesses that renovate their shops are more likely to have contact with a private protection organization, indicating that PPOs prey on shops that reveal that their wealth. Thus, demand from busi? nesses and the incentives facing PPOs… Expand

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