Privacy in implementation

  title={Privacy in implementation},
  author={Ronen Gradwohl},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
In most implementation frameworks, agents care only about the outcome and not at all about the way in which it was obtained. Additionally, typical mechanisms for full implementation involve the complete revelation of all private information to the planner. In this paper I consider the problem of full implementation with agents who may prefer to protect their privacy. I analyze the extent to which privacy-protecting mechanisms can be constructed under various assumptions about agents… CONTINUE READING

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