Privacy Signaling Games with Binary Alphabets

  title={Privacy Signaling Games with Binary Alphabets},
  author={Photios A. Stavrou and Serkan Sarıtaş and Mikael Skoglund},
  journal={2022 European Control Conference (ECC)},
In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets and single-bit transmission where a transmitter has a pair of messages, one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed, whereas the other message contains sensitive data and needs to be protected. The receiver wishes to estimate both messages to acquire as much information as possible. For this setup, we study the interactions between the transmitter and the receiver with non-aligned information… 

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