Corpus ID: 9308891

Privacy Failures in Encrypted Messaging Services: Apple iMessage and Beyond

@article{Coull2014PrivacyFI,
  title={Privacy Failures in Encrypted Messaging Services: Apple iMessage and Beyond},
  author={Scott E. Coull and Kevin P. Dyer},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
  year={2014},
  volume={2014},
  pages={168}
}
Instant messaging services are quickly becoming the most dominant form of communication among consumers around the world. Apple iMessage, for example, handles over 2 billion message each day, while WhatsApp claims 16 billion messages from 400 million international users. To protect user privacy, these services typically implement end-to-end and transport layer encryption, which are meant to make eavesdropping infeasible even for the service providers themselves. In this paper, however, we show… Expand
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