Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders

@inproceedings{Leonardi2012PriorfreeAW,
  title={Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders},
  author={Stefano Leonardi and Tim Roughgarden},
  booktitle={STOC},
  year={2012}
}
Prior-free auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders' valuations and provide worst-case (input-by-input) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good prior-free auctions with non-identical bidders. Prior-free auctions can approximate meaningful benchmarks for non-identical bidders only when "sufficient qualitative information" about the bidder asymmetry is publicly known. We consider digital goods auctions where there is a… CONTINUE READING

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