Principal-agent problems in international organizations

@article{Vaubel2006PrincipalagentPI,
  title={Principal-agent problems in international organizations},
  author={Roland Vaubel},
  journal={The Review of International Organizations},
  year={2006},
  volume={1},
  pages={125-138}
}
  • R. Vaubel
  • Published 6 June 2006
  • Political Science, Economics
  • The Review of International Organizations
The paper provides a framework for analysing control problems in international organisations and reviews the disparate evidence from a public-choice perspective. Most examples concern the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation. International organisations suffer from principal-agent problems more than other public or private organisations do because the chain of delegation is more extended. As survey evidence demonstrates, the… 

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