Principal-Agent Models : An Expansion ?

@inproceedings{Waterman1998PrincipalAgentM,
  title={Principal-Agent Models : An Expansion ?},
  author={Richard W. Waterman and K. J. Sebastian Meier},
  year={1998}
}
Principal-agent models have been the basis for an extensive set of studies relating bureaucracy to elected officials. Yet despite the outpouring of research, there has been little attempt to test the basic assumptions of the principal-agent model. The model makes two assumptions: that goal conflict exists between principals and agents and that agents have more information than their principals, which results in an information asymmetry between them. But how valid are these assumptions? Can… CONTINUE READING

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