Pricing Traffic Networks with Mixed Vehicle Autonomy

@article{Mehr2019PricingTN,
  title={Pricing Traffic Networks with Mixed Vehicle Autonomy},
  author={Negar Mehr and Roberto Horowitz},
  journal={2019 American Control Conference (ACC)},
  year={2019},
  pages={2676-2682}
}
In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. [] Key Method First, we study the possibility of inducing such optimal equilibria by imposing a set of undifferentiated prices, i.e. a set of prices that treat both human-driven and autonomous vehicles similarly at each link. We provide an example which demonstrates that undifferentiated pricing is not sufficient for achieving minimum social delay.

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