Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems

  title={Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems},
  author={Emilio Calvo and Juan Carlos Santos},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
Abstract We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems that involve two types of heterogeneous outputs, divisible and indivisible. The Aumann–Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D63, C79. 



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