Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete Information

@inproceedings{Garg2005PriceOA,
  title={Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete Information},
  author={Dinesh Garg and Y. Narahari},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2005}
}
We consider a class of networks where n agents need to send their traffic from a given source to a given destination over m identical, non-intersecting, and parallel links. For such networks, our interest is in computing the worst case loss in social welfare when a distributed routing scheme is used instead of a centralized one. For this, we use a noncooperative game model with price of anarchy as the index of comparison. Previous work in this area makes the complete information assumption… CONTINUE READING
BETA

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 11 REFERENCES

Selfish Routing

  • Tim Roughgarden
  • PhD thesis,
  • 2002
2 Excerpts

Papadimitriou . Algorithms , games , and the Internet

  • H. Christos
  • ACM STOC ’ 01 , Hersonissos , Crete , Greece…
  • 2001

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…