Corpus ID: 2370820

Preventing Your Faults From Telling Your Secrets: Defenses Against Pigeonhole Attacks

@article{Shinde2015PreventingYF,
  title={Preventing Your Faults From Telling Your Secrets: Defenses Against Pigeonhole Attacks},
  author={Shweta Shinde and Zheng Leong Chua and V. Narayanan and P. Saxena},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2015},
  volume={abs/1506.04832}
}

Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, +1 author P. Saxena

Published 2015

Computer Science

ArXiv

New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt --- leaking 27% on average and up to 100% of the secret bits… CONTINUE READING

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