Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets

@article{Shinde2016PreventingPF,
  title={Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets},
  author={Shweta Shinde and Zheng Leong Chua and V. Narayanan and P. Saxena},
  journal={Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  year={2016}
}
  • Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, +1 author P. Saxena
  • Published 2016
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
  • New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt -- leaking 27% on average and up to 100% of the secret bits in… CONTINUE READING
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