Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."

  title={Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."},
  author={Alan M. Leslie},
  journal={Psychological Review},
  • A. Leslie
  • Published 1 October 1987
  • Psychology
  • Psychological Review
One of the major developments of the second year of human life is the emergence of the ability to pretend. A child's knowledge of a real situation is apparently contradicted and distorted by pretense. If, as generally assumed, the child is just beginning to construct a system for internally representing such knowledge, why is this system of representation not undermined by its use in both comprehending and producing pretense? In this article I present a theoretical analysis of the… Expand

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