Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion

  title={Presidents, the Use of Military Force, and Public Opinion},
  author={Bradley Lian and John R. O'neal},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={277 - 300}
It is conventional wisdom that the public rallies 'round the president when military force is used abroad. Indeed, this belief has encouraged the view that presidents are apt to rattle the saber to divert attention from domestic problems. The rally effect is assessed by measuring the change in the president's popularity following all major uses of force by the United States from 1950 through 1984. Surprisingly, for these 102 cases, the mean change in the president's approval rating is 0%, even… 

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Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson

  • J. Mueller
  • Political Science
    American Political Science Review
  • 1970
I think [my grandchildren] will be proud of two things. What I did for the Negro and seeing it through in Vietnam for all of Asia. The Negro cost me 15 points in the polls and Vietnam cost me 20.

The Determinants of Presidential Foreign Policy Choice

What explains presidential decision making on foreign policy? This question is addressed by assessing the relative influence of the international and domestic environments on presidential foreign

The Means and Ends of Foreign Policy as Determinants of Presidential Support

Previous research has not found foreign policy attitudes to be an important determinant of political evaluations (such as voting or presidential evaluation). Such findings, though, may have