Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and coalition discipline in Brazil

  title={Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and coalition discipline in Brazil},
  author={Oct{\'a}vio Amorim Neto},
  journal={Dados-revista De Ciencias Sociais},
All presidential cabinets formed in Brazil between 1985 and 1998 included politicians from more than one party and could, in principle, be defined as coalition cabinets. The article evaluates to what extent this is a valid statement as far as the legislative behavior of the cabinet parties is concerned. An indicator is proposed for measuring the rate of cabinet coalescence, based on the ratio between the percentage of ministerial posts held by each party represented in the cabinet and the… Expand
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