Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries

@article{Tsebelis2007PresidentialCA,
  title={Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries},
  author={George Tsebelis and Tatiana P. Rizova},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  year={2007},
  volume={40},
  pages={1155 - 1182}
}
Nine out of 27 presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given adequate attention in the comparative politics literature. The authors analyze veto procedures in the excommunist region (27 countries) and argue that amendatory veto power enhances presidential powers in legislative decision making. The findings are particularly important in light of the fact that one of the goals of… 

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