Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America

  title={Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America},
  author={George Tsebelis and Eduardo Alem{\'a}n},
  journal={World Politics},
  pages={396 - 420}
Ten Latin American presidents have a power that has not received the study that it deserves: the ability to make positive suggestions to vetoed bills. These "amendatory observations" return to Congress for a final round of voting. Sometimes the presidential version of the bill becomes the default alternative automatically and may require qualified majorities to be overturned. The authors analyze veto procedures in eighteen Latin American countries and argue that amendatory veto power… 

Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries

Nine out of 27 presidents in the former communist world have the power to amend vetoed legislation. These presidential powers in the former Soviet Bloc have not been given adequate attention in the

Tall, Grande, or Venti: Presidential Powers in the United States and Latin America

Comparative constitutional studies rank the US president as relatively weak and most Latin American presidents as strong. However, specialized studies suggest that US presidents have great abilities

Designing cabinets: Presidential politics and cabinet instability in Latin America

This paper proposes and tests a theory about the strategic use of cabinet appointments by executives in presidential systems. The theory argues that cabinet turnover plays a crucial role in

Designing Cabinets: Presidential Politics and Ministerial Instability

This article proposes a set of arguments about the strategic use of cabinet appointments by executives in presidential systems. Although recent work has greatly improved our understanding of

Ruling by Statute

What are the main factors that allow presidents and prime ministers to enact policy through acts of government that carry the force of law? Or, simply put, when does a government actually govern? I

Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multiparty Presidential Systems

This article analyzes the use of vetoes in multiparty presidential systems. It suggests that the nature of executive-legislative bargaining is fundamentally altered when multiple parties compose the

Checking Presidential Power

A central concern about the robustness of democratic rule in new democracies is the concentration of power in the executive branch and the potential this creates for abuse. This concern is felt

Presidential Veto in the Law-Making Process: The Case of Kenya's Amendatory Recommendations

  • W. Ochieng
  • Political Science
    Journal of African Law
  • 2022
This article contends that the interpretation of article 115 of the Constitution of Kenya as providing for amendatory recommendations as a form of presidential veto to legislative bills is a

Legislative override and particularistic bills in unstable democracies: Ecuador in comparative perspective

ABSTRACT This article addresses, in a comparative perspective, the conditions under which legislatures find greater incentives to overcome a presidential veto. The authors’ framework points out that

Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success*

Presidential systems around the world vary in the proportion of legislators required to override an executive veto. We argue that the nature of the override provision affects executive influence in



Measuring Presidential Power

Despite an increased need to measure presidential power and the increased use of such measurements in empirical studies, there has been little examination of the relative merits of alternative

Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

Part I. Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy: 1. Basic choices in democratic regime types 2. What is presidentialism? Criticisms and responses 3. The constitutional origin and survival of

The presidential veto : touchstone of the American presidency

Lectures delivered in 1986 at the University of Georgia. Chapter 1, for example, transforms many complex theories and doctrines into sharply edged puzzle pieces that Shapiro deftly moves about in

Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986

One of the most important American political institutons is the executive veto. The Founding Fathers sought to create an institution that would both protect the executive branch from encroachments of

The Core of the Constitution

It is often argued that the United States Constitution was designed so as to create a stable political order. Yet in the literature on the formal theory of democracy, there has been very little

The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter

  • George Tsebelis
  • Economics, Political Science
    American Political Science Review
  • 1994
The European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the

Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Ideology and valence 2. Accident and force 3. Legislative institutions in the constitution of 1980 4. Roll-call votes and senate committees 5. The Labor committee 6.


▪ Abstract Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto bargaining and some of its more interesting and

Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America

A legitimate and effective democracy is essential for sustainable economic and social development. This updated and expanded edition of "Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin

Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy

1. Introduction: political institutions and the determinants of public policy Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins Part I. Theory: 2. The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes