Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel

@article{Keller2001PresentistsSB,
  title={Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel},
  author={Simon Keller and Michael Nelson},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2001},
  volume={79},
  pages={333 - 345}
}
Do non-present things exist? Four-dimensionalists say that they do, and presentists say that they don’t. Four-dimensionalists believe that time is a fourth dimension, orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions. In the same way that things exist at other points in space, says the four-dimensionalist, we should accept that things exist at other points in time. Just as Shania Twain exists, but not here, John Denver exists, but not now. On the fourdimensionalist view, the universe is an existing… Expand
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References

SHOWING 1-6 OF 6 REFERENCES
Both Merricks and Carter and Hestevold argue that any tensed theory of time
  • American Philosophical Quarterly
  • 1994
In addition to the papers noted above, see Ned Markosian
  • Philosophical Papers
  • 1994
For more on the ways in which presentists have tried to find truthmakers for nonpresent-tensed facts
  • 1988
The Facts of Causation
  • Real Time
  • 1981
Ned Markosian makes a similar suggestion in 'The 3D/4D Controversy
    Note that some presentists-Bigelow is an example-will deny that there are cross-time relations. What seem to be cross-time relations