Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

@article{Nez2014PreferenceIR,
  title={Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections},
  author={Mat{\'i}as N{\'u}{\~n}ez and Jean-François Laslier},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2014},
  volume={42},
  pages={313-340}
}
If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically… 
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