Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Abstract

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest… (More)

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Kushnir2010PreferenceSI, title={Preference Signaling in Matching Markets}, author={Alexey Kushnir and Muriel Niederle and Peter Coles}, year={2010} }