Preference Change

  title={Preference Change},
  author={Ana{\"i}s Cadilhac and Nicholas Asher and Alex Lascarides and Farah Benamara},
  journal={Journal of Logic, Language and Information},
Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences: preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic model of preferences that extends an existing static model (Boutilier et al. in J… 
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