Preference Aggregation Theory Without Acyclicity: The Core Without Majority Dissatisfaction

@article{Kumabe2011PreferenceAT,
  title={Preference Aggregation Theory Without Acyclicity: The Core Without Majority Dissatisfaction},
  author={M. Kumabe and H. R. Mihara},
  journal={Games \& Political Behavior eJournal},
  year={2011}
}
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only if the number of alternatives in the agenda is less than the Nakamura number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by deleting from… Expand

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