Pragmatic versus syntactic approaches to training deductive reasoning

@article{Cheng1986PragmaticVS,
  title={Pragmatic versus syntactic approaches to training deductive reasoning},
  author={Patricia W. Cheng and Keith J. Holyoak and Richard E. Nisbett and Lindsay M. Oliver},
  journal={Cognitive Psychology},
  year={1986},
  volume={18},
  pages={293-328}
}

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