Practical Governmental Voting with Unconditional Integrity and Privacy

@inproceedings{Yang2017PracticalGV,
  title={Practical Governmental Voting with Unconditional Integrity and Privacy},
  author={Nan Yang and Jeremy Clark},
  booktitle={Financial Cryptography Workshops},
  year={2017}
}
Throughout the years, many cryptographically verifiable voting systems have been proposed with a whole spectrum of features and security assumptions. Where the voter casts an in-person (and possibly paper) ballot and leaves, as is common in a governmental election, the majority of the proposals fall in the category of providing unconditional integrity and computational privacy. A minority of papers have looked at the inverse scenario: everlasting privacy with computational integrity. However as… 
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