Power and Political Institutions

  title={Power and Political Institutions},
  author={Terry M. Moe},
  journal={Perspectives on Politics},
  pages={215 - 233}
  • T. Moe
  • Published 1 June 2005
  • Political Science
  • Perspectives on Politics
Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others, depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this. As a result, it gives us… 
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