Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

  title={Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes},
  author={Milan W. Svolik},
  journal={Public Choice \& Political Economy eJournal},
  • Milan W. Svolik
  • Published 1 November 2008
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice & Political Economy eJournal
I examine a fundamental problem of politics in authoritarian regimes: the dictator and the ruling coalition must share power and govern in an environment where political influence must be backed by a credible threat of violence. I develop a model of authoritarian politics in which power-sharing is complicated by this conflict of interest: by exploiting his position, the dictator may acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by… 

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