Position Paper: Certificate Root Stores—An Area of Unity or Disparity?

@article{Purushothaman2022PositionPC,
  title={Position Paper: Certificate Root Stores—An Area of Unity or Disparity?},
  author={Jegan Purushothaman and Abdelrahman Abdou},
  journal={Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test},
  year={2022}
}
  • Jegan PurushothamanA. Abdou
  • Published 21 October 2021
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings of the 15th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
Organizations like Apple, Microsoft, Mozilla and Google maintain certificate root stores, which are used as trust anchors by their popular software platforms. Is there sufficient consensus on their root-store inclusion and trust policies? We measure disparities among their root stores, accounting for various aspects such as inclusion policies, delivery methods, trust context, and the certificates themselves. Disparities appear astounding, including in the government-owned certificates that they… 

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