Position Auctions with Consumer Search

@article{Athey2007PositionAW,
  title={Position Auctions with Consumer Search},
  author={Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison},
  journal={NBER Working Paper Series},
  year={2007}
}
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed. 
Position Auctions with Consumer Search Citation
The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for " sponsored-link "Expand
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