Position Auctions with Budgets : Existence and Uniqueness

@inproceedings{Ashlagi2009PositionAW,
  title={Position Auctions with Budgets : Existence and Uniqueness},
  author={Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim and Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  year={2009}
}
We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constraints. Our Mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007). By enabling multiple price trajectories that ascent concurrently we are able to retrieve all the desired propertied of the Generalized English Auction, that was not originally designed for players with budgets. In particular, the unique ex-post equilibrium outcome of our… CONTINUE READING
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