• Corpus ID: 33626091

Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics

  title={Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics},
  author={William H. Sandholm},
  booktitle={Economic learning and social evolution},
  • W. Sandholm
  • Published in
    Economic learning and social…
    17 December 2010
  • Economics
This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the 1970s through recent advances. Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists… 

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A novel unified framework for characterising population dynamics via a single partial differential equation (Theorem 1) is provided and extensive experimental results validating that Theorem 1 holds for a variety of learning methods and population games are presented.

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  • E. Altman
  • Computer Science
    Encyclopedia of Systems and Control
  • 2015
Evolutionary games constitute the most recent major mathematical tool for understanding, modelling and predicting evolution in biology and other fields. They complement other well establlished tools

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A systematic methodology is put forth to characterize the stability of the dynamical system that results from the feedback interaction between the payoff mechanism and the revision process, which is important because the set of stable equilibria is an accurate predictor of the population's long-term behavior.

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Bargaining and hold-up

  • Friedman and Ostrov
  • 2008

Public good provision Implementation and decentralized control: Cabrales (1999), Cabrales and Ponti Residential segregation: Young Applications in biology

  • Zhang (2004a,b), Dokumacı and Sandholm Preference evolution: G ¨ uth and Yaari Huck and Oechssler Cultural evolution: Bisin and Verdier (2001), Sandholm (2001b), Kuran and Sandholm
  • 1982