Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état

@article{Casper2014PopularPA,
  title={Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’{\'e}tat},
  author={Brett Allen Casper and Scott A. Tyson},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2014},
  volume={76},
  pages={548 - 564}
}
Elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating a coup. Citizens, who desire political reform, face a similar coordination problem when contemplating protest. Since elites and citizens interact with the same leadership, these coordination problems are invariably linked. We develop a model which exploits this link to isolate an informational mechanism connecting popular protests and coups. Protests aggregate citizen information and provide elites with a public signal which helps… 

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