Corpus ID: 235829584

Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores

  title={Polynomial Time Algorithms to Find an Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Chores},
  author={Shant Boodaghians and Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury and Ruta Mehta},
Competitive equilibrium with equal income (CEEI) is considered one of the best mechanisms to allocate a set of items among agents fairly and efficiently. In this paper, we study the computation of CEEI when items are chores that are disliked (negatively valued) by agents, under 1-homogeneous and concave utility functions which includes linear functions as a subcase. It is well-known that, even with linear utilities, the set of CEEI may be non-convex and disconnected, and the problem is PPAD… Expand

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