Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework

  title={Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework},
  author={Adam Meirowitz},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from p ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll respons occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist the poll only asks respondents which… CONTINUE READING

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