Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

  title={Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan},
  author={James D. Gwartney and Randall G. Holcombe},
  journal={Constitutional Political Economy},
James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules… 
Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state
In a number of works, James M. Buchanan set out a proposal for a ‘demogrant’—a form of universal basic income that applied the principles of generality and non discrimination to the tax and the
On the Inefficiency of Political Exchange
A classic argument in economic theory is that in a world of zero transaction costs the free bargaining among parties spontaneously leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Attempts have been
James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future
A substantial amount of James Buchanan’s academic work was devoted to his constitutional project: the development of procedures for designing constitutional rules that would create a government
Where Economics Went Wrong: A Review Essay
In their recent book Where Economics Went Wrong, David Colander and Craig Freedman (2018) argue that economics went wrong when it abandoned the Classical liberal firewall that demanded separation of
Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking
This article examines James Buchanan’s conception of lawmaking, with specific respect to the institutional features he proposes in order to promote individual liberty. Buchanan’s constitutional
Club Women and the Provision of Local Public Goods
Despite the variety of legal, political, and social barriers facing women who sought to contribute to public life in the 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States, women’s clubs emerged as


The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy
In his foreword, Robert D Tollison identifies the main objective of Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan's THE REASON OF RULES: "...a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists and
Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist
It is almost trite to call Professor Buchanan one of the original thinkers of our time, but the clarity and gentleness of his reasoning too often lets us take for common sense and common knowledge
The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D Tollison states
Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets
p OFESSOR Kenneth Arrow's provocative essay, Social Choice and Individual Values,2 has stimulated a great deal of comment and discussion during the two years since its publication. Reviewers and
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Explores the relation between a socialist view of society and the democratic method of government; argues that socialism is probably inevitable, for political rather than economic reasons. The book
Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes
Democracy in Deficit opened the door for much of the current work on political business cycles and the incorporation of public-choice considerations into macroeconomic theory. Even in the area of
What Should Economists Do
This volume is a collection of sixteen essays on three general topics: the methodology of economics, the applicability of economic reasoning to political science and other social sciences, and the
Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State
In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the
The domain of constitutional economics
Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules, and institutions within which individuals interact, and the processes through which