Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition

@article{Beniers2004PoliticiansMP,
  title={Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition},
  author={K. Beniers and Robert Dur},
  journal={International Tax and Public Finance},
  year={2004},
  volume={14},
  pages={29-54}
}
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to… Expand
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We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rentsExpand
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