Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs

  title={Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs},
  author={Branislav L. Slantchev},
  journal={International Studies Quarterly},
Domestic audience costs can help leaders establish credible commitments by tying their hands. Most studies assume these costs without explaining how they arise. I link domestic audience costs to the citizens' ability to sanction the leadership for pursuing a policy they would not want if they had the same information about its quality. How can citizens learn about policy quality? I model two information transmission mechanisms: one potentially contaminated by politically motivated strategic… Expand

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