Politically – connected firms : Can they squeeze the State ?

  title={Politically – connected firms : Can they squeeze the State ?},
  author={M C S R Faccio},
For a sample of 42 countries, I examine firms whose controlling shareholders and top managers are members of national parliaments or governments. I find that this overlap is quite widespread, especially in highly corrupted countries. Connected companies enjoy easier access to debt financing, lower taxation, and stronger market power. These benefits increase when companies are connected through their owner, with a minister, or a seasoned politician. Furthermore, these benefits are generally… CONTINUE READING
Highly Influential
This paper has highly influenced 35 other papers. REVIEW HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CITATIONS
Highly Cited
This paper has 297 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

From This Paper

Figures, tables, and topics from this paper.


Publications citing this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 230 extracted citations

Corruption and Firms : Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil

Emanuele Colonnelli
View 11 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Political connections, directors' status and auditor choice: Evidence from China

2013 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering 20th Annual Conference Proceedings • 2013
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

298 Citations

Citations per Year
Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 298 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.


Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 21 references

Stock Exchange, “Brazil company handbook”, edition 2000/2001

Sao Paulo
Czech Republic Securities Center of the Czech Republic, • 2001
View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Do some outside directors play a political role?

Agrawal, Anup, R Charles
Knoeber, • 2001

Economic policy and special interest politics,

Persson, Torsten
Journal of Finance, • 2001

Political ownership,

Bennedsen, Morten, Sven E. Feldmann
Journal of Public Economics, • 2000

Seize the State, seize the day

Hellman, S Joel, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann
Science Review, • 2000

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…