Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change

@inproceedings{Mesquita2009PoliticalSA,
  title={Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change},
  author={Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith},
  year={2009}
}
Incumbent political leaders risk deposition by challengers within the existing political rules and by revolutionary threats. Building on Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow’s selectorate theory, the model here examines the policy responses of office-seeking leaders to revolutionary threats. Whether leaders suppress public goods such as freedom of assembly and freedom of information to hinder the organizational ability of potential revolutionaries or appease potential revolutionaries… CONTINUE READING
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