• Corpus ID: 18563382

Political Reform in China: The Effect of Local Elections

  title={Political Reform in China: The Effect of Local Elections},
  author={Monica Martinez-Bravo and Gerard Padr{\'o} and Nancy Qian and Yang Yao},
We examine the effects of introducing village elections on public goods expenditures, income distribution and land use in rural China. We construct a large panel data set of village administrative records to document the history of political reforms and economic policies for over two hundred villages. We exploit the staggered timing of the introduction of village elections to find that elections significantly increased public goods expenditure financed by villagers. In addition, we find that… 

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