Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes : What are the Stylized Facts ? ¤

@inproceedings{Persson2000PoliticalIA,
  title={Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes : What are the Stylized Facts ? ¤},
  author={Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini},
  year={2000}
}
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 and onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian elections, social transfers are smaller and aggregate spending less responsive to to income shocks than under proportional elections. Institutions also shape electoral cycles: only in presidential… CONTINUE READING
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