Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders

@article{Mesquita2002PoliticalIP,
  title={Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders},
  author={Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James D. Morrow and Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith},
  journal={British Journal of Political Science},
  year={2002},
  volume={32},
  pages={559 - 590}
}
Institutional arrangements influence the type of policies that leaders pursue. We examine two institutional variables: size of the selectorate (S) – the set of people who have an institutional say in choosing leaders – and the size of the winning coalition (W) – the minimal set of people whose support the incumbent needs in order to remain in power. The larger the winning coalition, the greater the emphasis leaders place on effective public policy. When W is small, leaders focus on providing… 

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