Corpus ID: 154642159

Political Economy of Conflict, Cooperation and Economic Growth: Nepalese Dilemma

  title={Political Economy of Conflict, Cooperation and Economic Growth: Nepalese Dilemma},
  author={K. Bhattarai},
Conflict among feudal factors led by the King, working people in trade and industry led by political parties, marginal, poverty trapped people threatened and mobilised by Maoist rebels in Nepal creates a very unproductive environment where investors and entrepreneurs do not get any productive opportunity. Non-cooperation among competing political and economic forces has brought Nepal into crisis and growth disaster. The major reason for conflict is short-sighted horizon of these players who try… Expand

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